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Abstract 
 
 
 
This lecture discusses the contemporary politics of citizenship. Citizenship is an 
elusive phenomenon as states attach different rights to citizenship and employ 
different rules for the acquisition and loss of citizenship. How to acquire citizenship 
and what it means thus depends on the specific context. The significance of 
citizenship also differs for each person. For example, whereas some immigrants are 
very interested to naturalize and acquire the citizenship of their new country of 
residence, others are happy to just keep their original citizenship. In an interconnected 
world, increasingly more people are citizens of more than one country. However, 
whereas combating dual citizenship is arguably futile, states continue to deter people 
from it via restrictive rules. Government -under pressure from skeptical electorates- 
also use citizenship status to address problems of immigrant integration or 
international terrorism, even though citizenship as a legal status is not well suited to 
address such challenges. Research shows that making the requirements for citizenship 
more difficult discourages especially those immigrants who are most in need of a 
secure status. The lecture discusses comparative research on the causes and 
consequences of citizenship policies and outlines an interdisciplinary research agenda. 
3  
Mijnheer de Rector, ladies and gentlemen, 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Today I would like to talk to you about the elusive nature of citizenship. 
 
 
 
The argument, which I will develop in my lecture, is that citizenship eludes 
individuals, voters and policy-makers. With “elusive” I mean to say: citizenship 
brings high, but often unrealistic expectations. First, from individuals who are a 
citizen or aspire to be one; second, from voters who influence the direction of public 
policies and thus the rules about the acquisition and loss of citizenship; and, third, 
from policy-makers who use citizenship to respond to societal problems, such as 
immigrant integration or international terrorism. These high expectations are 
understandable  because  citizenship  is  the  most  fundamental  political  status  and 
implies, to speak with Hannah Arendt, ‘the right to have rights’.1 
 
 
 
Yet, we should be careful not to attach too high expectations to citizenship. It is not 
equipped to tackle the diversity of challenges related to the organization of the ‘good 
life’ within political communities. Citizenship, for example, does not prevent racial 
discrimination. At the same time, making citizenship conditional upon high 
‘integration requirements’, such as passing a language and civic integration test, or 
asking a very high fee for it, does not guarantee that integration problems will be 
solved. Making citizenship conditional upon stricter requirements merely makes it a 
more selective status. As a result, contemporary citizenship laws are frequently 
subject to amendments, though often without clear or even realistic expectations 
about what these policy changes can achieve. 
 
 
In this lecture I will discuss how states regulate the acquisition and loss of citizenship, 
why they do so differently and what are the consequences of doing so. 
 
 
Let me illustrate the elusive nature of citizenship with two examples: one of a beauty 
pageant and another one of a famous actor. 
 
1 
Arendt 1994, p. 296. 
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Ariana Miyamoto is a Japanese beauty pageant who was born to a Japanese mother 
and an African American father.
2 
She was crowned Miss Japan 2015, but her victory 
faced criticism from people who verbally abused her for being “haafu”. This term is 
used in Japanese to refer to somebody who is biracial; in other words, somebody who 
is ethnically only “half” Japanese. Hence, whereas Miyamoto holds Japanese 
citizenship and speaks fluent Japanese, some people do not think she is “Japanese 
enough” to represent Japan in the Miss Universe elections this year.3 
 
 
Second, there is the case of Russell Crowe, the well-known actor from movies such as 
‘Beautiful Mind’ and ‘Gladiator’. Crowe was born in New Zealand and, according to 
his Wikipedia entry,
4 
his ancestors were English, German, Irish, Māori, Norwegian, 
Scottish, Swedish, Welsh, Italian and possibly an Australian convict. While he’s a 
Kiwi, a citizen of New Zealand, when Crowe was four years old his family moved to 
Sydney, Australia. He moved back to Auckland, New Zealand when he was 14 and 
back again to Australia when he was 21 and started his acting career. Recently it was 
reported that Crowe applied for Australian citizenship in 2006 and again in 2013 but 
was rejected because he failed to fulfill the residency requirements. Due to shooting 
major motion pictures abroad he would have been away from Australia often and – 
apparently– does not fulfill the residency requirements for naturalization in Australia. 
In his own words: “I’ve been voted one of Australia’s 50 national treasures. I’ve even 
had my face on an Australian stamp, the only non-Australian to do so, apart from the 
Queen, of course. It’s so, so … unreasonable.”5 
 
 
 
The cases of Ariana Miyamoto and Russell Crowe, in my view, provide two 
contrasting illustrations of what I would term “elusive citizenship”. Miyamoto is 
formally is a citizen of Japan, but still faces unequal treatment in practice; Russell 
Crowe is considered an Australian by many, even had his face on an Australian 
stamp, but formally is not a citizen of Australia. In other words: citizenship is elusive 
 
2 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariana_Miyamoto [last accessed on 25 April 2015]. 
3 
http://www.designntrend.com/articles/45307/20150325/miss-universe-japan-2015-ariana-miyamoto- 
slammed-looking-japanese-enough.htm [last accessed on 25 April 2015]. 
4 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell_Crowe [last accessed on 25 April 2015]. 
5 
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2015/mar/25/russell-crowe-twice-denied-australian-citizenship-its- so-
so-unreasonable [last accessed on 25 April 2015]. However, Australia's Immigration Department 
said it had no record of any such application by Crowe. 
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in the sense that even if you have it, you may not be considered a full citizen; whereas 
even if you don’t have it, you may still be treated as equal. 
 
 
In this lecture, my interest will be especially in the political regulation of the access to 
citizenship, as well as the rules that govern the loss of it. In other words: under what 
conditions does one actually acquire citizenship? And how does one loose it? 
 
 
Over the past decades, one can observe a continuous trend of changes in the laws that 
regulate the acquisition and loss of citizenship, not only in Europe,
6 
but across the 
globe.
7
 
 
 
Let’s look, for example, at the Netherlands. This is probably the best example of a 
country where citizenship law has been continuously in flux. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Changes in Dutch citizenship law since 1985 
25 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
15 
major changes 
minor changes 
10 informal change 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
0 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
 
Sources: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0003738/geldigheidsdatum_31-03-2015/informatie 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Hansen and Weil 2001; Bauböck et al 2006. 
7 
Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2000, 2001. 
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In Figure 1 you see an overview of the changes in Dutch citizenship law, since 1985. 
The vertical bars indicate the number of grounds for acquisition and loss of 
citizenship that were amended in a particular year. The blue bars indicate the major 
changes. Since 1985, Dutch citizenship law has been revised comprehensively three 
times: first of all in 1985 with a completely new Nationality Act, then in 2003 with a 
comprehensive revision and again in 2009. Major and minor legal revisions were 
introduced in 7 other years. Moreover, one of the most significant amendments to 
Dutch citizenship policy –the complete toleration of dual citizenship between 1991 
and 1996 – was not introduced by law, but by an implementing measure that tolerated 
dual citizenship in practice.
8 
On average, over the past decades Dutch citizenship law 
 
has been altered almost every other year. 
 
 
 
Are all these changes really necessary? Is not there too much politics around 
citizenship? Of course, there may be good reasons to introduce changes to the 
citizenship law. Think of the need to remove previously discriminatory provisions 
that biased citizenship law in the Netherlands in favour of men, until recently.
9 
The 
consequences of this unequal treatment of women were still repaired by amendments 
to the law as recent as 2010. Other amendments have followed from trends in the 
modernization of family law, for example with regard to same-sex partnerships.
10
 
 
 
What has happened –not just in the Netherlands, but more widely– is what I would 
term the ‘instrumentalization’ of citizenship law.11 Citizenship is viewed as a means 
(an instrument) to solve perceived societal problems, since the 1990s especially 
related to immigrant integration and lately also to national security. However, 
citizenship is not a panacea for all our problems. Instrumentalizing citizenship for 
policy goals  that  it  is  not  suitable  to  address  is  a  self-defeating strategy.  Using 
 
 
 
 
8 
In 1996, the proposed law that formalized these changes was voted down in the Senate and the 
restrictive policy came in place again –though since 2003 with substantial exceptions (cf. Vink 2001). 
9 
For example, until 1936, in the Netherlands, a Dutch woman who married a foreigner or a stateless 
person automatically lost her Dutch citizenship. Until 1964, a foreign woman who married a Dutch 
citizen automatically acquired Dutch citizenship. Until 1985, unless they were born out of wedlock, 
children acquired Dutch citizenship if the father was Dutch, but not if only the mother was a Dutch 
citizen. Van Oers et al 2013, p. 8. 
10
See https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2004-335.html and 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2013-481.html [last accessed on 25 April 2015]. 
11 
See also Vink and De Groot 2010. 
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citizenship as integration tool is destined to lead to selective incorporation at best and 
thus to undermine the very objective it aims to achieve. 
 
 
This is what I call the ‘paradox of elusive citizenship’: the more we expect from 
citizenship, the more hopes we put into it, the less it brings us, the more out of reach it 
gets. 
 
 
 
2. Citizenship: an elusive status 
 
 
 
So what is citizenship? And what does it get you? 
 
 
 
Citizenship (or ‘nationality’ as it is often termed in international law) in the first place 
is a legal status that indicates the relation between an individual and a state. Hence, it 
is an instrument of classification: it is a status that divides persons into two groups: 
citizens and foreigners. In this sense, citizenship is in itself an empty categorizing 
concept  (speaking  with  my  colleague  Rene  de  Groot), 
12   
which  only  acquires 
 
substance within a specific political context. Having citizenship entails legal rights, 
such as the right to enter your country and to live and work there without restriction, 
the right to vote, the right to hold political office, among others, as well as duties, 
such as the obligation to serve in the military. 
 
 
Some of you may think of citizenship as a passport. However, keep in mind that a 
passport is primarily a travel document and in itself does not grant any of the rights 
attached to citizenship. First of all, your passport may have expired, but –luckily– this 
does not mean that your citizenship has.
13
 
 
 
Second, passports are sometimes handed out to persons who actually are not citizens 
of a state. For example, after the First World War, so-called Nansen passports were 
 
 
 
 
12 
De Groot 1988. 
13 
In the Netherlands, however, the expiry of your passport may be viewed as indication that you no 
longer are interested in Dutch citizenship and, as a result, when you have lived abroad for more than 10 
years, not having renewed your passport may cause the loss of Dutch citizenship –provided you have 
another citizenship. 
8  
issued to refugees from the Russian civil war who had become stateless after Lenin 
had revoked citizenship for Russian expatriates in 1921.
14
 
 
 
A third reason for why having a passport should not be equaled to having citizenship, 
is that some countries differentiate between various types of citizenship statuses. For 
example, in Latvia, around 260 thousand residents –largely Russophones who arrived 
in Latvia during the Soviet era between 1940 and 1991– hold the status of ‘non- 
citizen’. These non-citizens, according to Latvian law, are not stateless because they 
hold the right to reside in Latvia and they are also issued with Latvian passports. 
However, compared with Latvian citizens, their rights are curtailed: they cannot vote 
and they cannot hold certain positions in government. These non-citizens are not 
stateless, but they are not full citizens either.
15
 
 
 
 
What are the rights and duties attached to citizenship varies strongly per country. For 
example, whereas having citizenship normally implies having voting rights, in many 
countries there are restrictions on the exercise of these rights. Hence, if you are a 
Dutch citizen who resides in Portugal, you are allowed to vote for the Tweede Kamer 
elections in the Netherlands. But if you are a citizen of Denmark, for example, you 
only have the right to vote in national elections if you actually reside in Denmark.
16 
Remarkably, even for elections of the European Parliament (for which all EU citizens 
have the right to vote),
17 
if you are residing outside your own country, it matters 
which EU member state you are a citizen of. If you are Dutch, you are fine. If you 
reside in Portugal you can vote for either Dutch or Portuguese representatives to the 
EP (but not for both). But if you are Danish and living in Portugal, your rights are 
restricted: you can only vote for Portuguese representatives. 
18 
Whereas European 
citizens have the same rights, in practice your rights will differ based on which 
member state you are a citizen of. 
 
14 
Later similar travel documents were also issues to Armenian, Assyrian and Turkish refugees. While 
Nansen passports are no longer issued today, states do grant so-called ‘certificates of identity’ that may 
serve as travel document for refugees, stateless persons or persons who have been refused a passport by 
their own national authorities. 
15 
Kruma 2010. 
16 
The same applies to Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Malta, Sweden or the UK, see http://eudo- 
citizenship.eu/electoral-rights/comparing-electoral- 
rights?application=ElectoralRightsNonResident&p=&search=1&modeby=ElectionType&ElectionTyp 
e=National+Legislative [last accessed on 25 April 2015]. 
17 
Article 22(2) TFEU. 
18 
Exceptions are civil servants and posted workers. 
9  
 
These are only two examples of how the ‘substance’ of citizenship, that is: the rights 
attached to it, differs between jurisdictions. “All men are created equal”, to quote the 
US Declaration of Independence, but no citizenship is the same. 
 
 
 
3. Citizenship policy: trends and configurations 
 
 
 
Now, not only the substance of citizenship varies, but also the rules on how to get it 
(and how to loose it again, as a matter of fact). This variation makes citizenship 
highly elusive: a person who would be considered a citizen in one state, under similar 
circumstances may not be a citizen of another state. 
 
 
Whereas most persons are citizens of one state only, many are citizens of multiple 
states and –more problematic– some are a citizen of none. These two traditionally 
undesirable phenomena –dual citizenship and statelessness– are largely unavoidable 
anomalies to the international system. This has to do with the premise of national 
autonomy in determining the rules that govern the acquisition and loss of citizenship, 
which makes it difficult or even impossible to coordinate rules between states. As a 
result, some persons benefit from over-inclusive rules, on the one hand, and others 
suffer from under-inclusive rules. 
 
 
As the episode of Russell Crowe, illustrates, international migration complicates the 
regulation of citizenship. Crowe has been denied Australian citizenship on the basis of 
what he sees as ‘unreasonable’ grounds. But what are ‘reasonable’ grounds for the 
acquisition of citizenship, of course, is open to debate. 
 
 
Traditionally, states have two options to deal with the consequences of migration:
19 
they can privilege territorial inclusion and attribute citizenship at birth via ‘ius soli’ 
(the law of the soil) to all persons born at the territory of a state, or they can privilege 
ethnocultural inclusion and attribute citizenship at birth via ‘ius sanguinis’ (the law of 
the blood) to descendants of citizens. These different principles are sometimes seen as 
representing ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ approaches to citizenship. However, in a paper from 
 
19 
Weil (2001), pp. 19-21. 
10  
2013 co-authored with Rainer Bauböck,
20 
we demonstrate that it would be misleading 
to conceptualize the variation in citizenship laws along a single ‘civic’ versus ‘ethnic’ 
dimension. In our paper we analyze the citizenship laws of 36 European states on the 
basis of data collected by the EUDO CITIZENSHIP Observatory. 
 
 
While an important ‘territorial dimension’ characterizes citizenship regimes on the 
basis of provisions on territorial birthright and ordinary naturalization, we show that 
legal variation cannot be reduced to this single dimension. For a comprehensive 
analysis of citizenship regimes, indicators of ‘ethnocultural’ inclusion, such as ius 
sanguinis and cultural affinity criteria for naturalization, should also be taken into 
account. 
 
 
Our analysis also highlights that a limited number of states are characterized by 
expansive regimes that are inclusive on both dimensions (such as Ireland or Portugal) 
or, by contrast, insular regimes that are exclusive on both dimensions (such as Austria 
or Denmark). In other words, citizenship laws configure along two main dimensions, 
which are driven by different conceptions of inclusiveness. But the two principles are 
not mutually exclusive. 
 
 
We demonstrate that these different principles of inclusion lead to variation not only 
in the rules on the acquisition of citizenship, but also in those on the loss of 
citizenship. For example, in the Netherlands, citizenship is relatively accessible for 
foreign-born residents. But it is also relatively easy to lose your Dutch citizenship. 
 
 
In 2009, five Dutch speed skaters planned to acquire Kazakh citizenship in order to 
participate in the Vancouver Olympics. Because the Netherlands already has so many 
good speed skaters, the competition for Olympic tickets is extremely strong. Hence 
they were invited by the Kazakh Olympic federation to represent Kazakhstan in 
Vancouver. However, as the five speed skaters discovered, in the Netherlands, if you 
voluntarily acquire another citizenship, you automatically lose your Dutch citizenship 
(and the rights attached to it, such as the right to enter and reside in the Netherlands). 
Even though at least one of them had already become Kazakh national champion at 
 
 
20 
Vink and Bauböck (2013). 
11  
the 5km distance in 2009, at the last moment they all cancelled the planned 
naturalization in Kazakhstan after they were warned about the consequences.
21 
The 5k 
Kazakh champion from 2010, Jorrit Bergsma, became the 10k Olympic champion for 
the Netherlands in 2014. 
 
 
Citizenship is, of course, not just elusive for actors and speed skaters. More and more 
citizenship is seen as a flexible status
22 
that provides security and can facilitate life in 
a globalized world.
23
 
 
 
Consultancy firms such as Henley & Partners advise global clients about how to 
obtain a second, or third, passport. Best known are the ‘investor citizenship programs’ 
that exist in the Caribbean island nations of St. Kitts and Nevis, for example, where 
citizenship can be acquired for as little as $250,000. In the EU, Cyprus and Malta 
offer fast-track pathways to citizenship to foreign investors, though these require 
significantly higher investments, up to several millions.
24
 
 
 
This flexibility increases the elusiveness of citizenship: it may be more accessible, at 
some places you can simply buy it, but what does it really mean if citizenship is, 
indeed, for sale? 
 
 
As a result of migration, gender equality and more flexible attitudes to dual 
citizenship, increasingly more people find themselves in a de facto complex 
citizenship situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
See e.g. http://www.nu.nl/sport/2118092/naturalisatie-brengt-schaatsers-in-problemen.html [last 
accessed on 25 April 2015]. 
22 
Ong 
1999. 
23 
The website of Henley & Partners, which provides legal advice on how to obtain an additional 
passport, provides a good illustration to such an instrumental approach: ‘The date of an important 
business trip is approaching, and you find out that you need a visa. (…) If for some reason you cannot 
get or renew a passport in your home country (e.g. political instability, civil war, etc.), the right to 
another passport can be very useful, even critical. Even if you simply lose your passport, it may take 
some time until you can get a replacement, and having another passport may be crucial. (…) 
Citizenship may also be a factor in the tie-breaker rules of tax treaties. (…) For good reasons, many 
international business people and important persons who are active worldwide consider an alternative 
passport as  the  best  life  insurance  money can buy.’ Source:  https://www.henleyglobal.com/why- 
alternative-citizenship/ [last accessed on 25 April 2015]. 
24 Džankić 
2015. 
12  
x1
0
00
 
 
Figure 2. Dutch residents with Dutch and one or more other 
ci  zenships (1998-2014) 
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For example, in the Netherlands, immigrants acquiring Dutch citizenship need to 
renounce their previous citizenship unless they qualify for one of the exceptions. Yet, 
there are currently around 1.2 million Dutch citizens residing in the Netherlands with 
dual citizenship (around 7% of the total population).
25 
This number has doubled since 
the 1998, after the requirement to renounce one’s previous citizenship had been 
reintroduced  (Figure  2).  This  is  because  children  from  parents  with  different 
citizenships often automatically acquire dual citizenship. Hence, restrictive 
naturalization rules cannot stop dual citizenship. 
 
 
More flexible entry into citizenship is also reflected in greater flexibility with regard 
to loss of citizenship. Increasingly more states face pressures from expatriates who 
wish to naturalize in the country where they live. This leads to a trend of more 
tolerant policies. Based on a novel dataset of expatriate dual citizenship policies since 
1960 in over 200 states, collected with Rene de Groot and Chun Luk within the 
Maastricht Centre for Citizenship, Migration and Development (MACIMIDE), we 
 
 
 
25 
See e.g. Van Oers et al 2013, on the Dutch context. 
13  
find that dual citizenship toleration has increased dramatically over the last half 
century.
26
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows a strong, nearly linear trend towards acceptance of expatriate dual 
citizenship. The bold line represents the global trend. While only around a third of all 
countries that existed in the 1960s accepted dual citizenship, this percentage increases 
steadily to almost two-thirds of countries in 2015. This trend took place in all regions 
around the world, though more forcefully in the Americas and less strongly in Asia 
and Africa. In Europe, the change from restrictive to tolerant attitudes towards dual 
citizenship precisely follows the global trend. The Netherlands is an exception to this 
trend.
27
 
 
 
 
In a recent paper, co-authored with Arjan Schakel, David Reichel and with De Groot 
and Luk, we use these data to analyze why the traditionally restrictive dual citizenship 
 
 
 
26 
Vink, De Groot and Luk (2015). 
27 
Note that only 90 of these 200 states continuously existed between 1960 and 2015, but the graph 
based on these 90 states only looks almost the same, apart from the line for Africa where the 
acceptance of dual citizenship has gone hand in hand with an increase in the number of independent 
states. 
14  
policies ‘survive’ in some countries, but not in others.28 We find, first of all, that 
states that existed since 1960 have a greater than 50% chance to move from a 
restrictive to tolerant dual citizenship policy. Second, we find that the propensity to 
move to a tolerant regime does not depend on size of the country, economic strength, 
or experience of political violence. 
 
 
Third, we observe that what matters most is the dual citizenship policy of neighboring 
countries. If no neighboring country accepts expatriate dual citizenship, then 
restrictive policies have a 65 percent chance to survive after 50 years; if, however, all 
neighboring countries accept dual citizenship, the chance for restrictive policies to 
survive goes down to 20 percent. We call this a ‘diffusion’ effect, where tolerant 
policies in states put pressures on those policies in neighboring states. 
 
 
We hypothesize two underlying mechanisms. First, while fears of dual citizenship 
continue to exist, they weaken as more countries tolerate expatriate dual citizenship. 
This is a learning mechanism. Second, emigrant communities are aware of 
experiences of other groups in migration destination countries and put pressures on 
policies in neighboring states. This is an emulation mechanism: the international norm 
of dual citizenship is copied from one state to the other. 
 
 
Fourth, when we look closer at these processes, we expect that policy diffusion 
resonates especially within democratic regimes. After all, for electoral reasons, in 
democracies governments are more sensitive to the demands of expatriate 
communities and international norms. For non-democracies we find that there is no 
significant effect of policies of neighboring countries. Rather, it is the size of received 
remittances that matters for these countries: in other words, for autocratic states, it is 
money that matters. For democracies, however, the diffusion effect is significant and 
strong: here, norms matter, more than money. 
 
 
As a result, legislative attempts to countenance dual citizenship –as in the 
Netherlands– seem increasingly arbitrary and, arguably, futile. Our data show that the 
trend is unidirectional and that reverting back to restrictive policies rarely occurs. The 
 
 
28 
Vink, Schakel, Reichel, De Groot and Luk 2015. 
15  
%
 
pressure from expatriate communities was evident in the successful lobby of the 
Dutch emigrant community against the proposal of the previous government. 
Increasing expatriate dual citizenship toleration is a largely self-sustaining 
phenomenon.
29
 
 
 
 
4. Attitudes towards (dual) citizenship 
 
 
 
If dual citizenship is tolerated for expats, then why not for immigrants? This is a good 
question and let us now discuss the politics of citizenship a bit further. After all, if 
citizenship wasn’t a highly politicized issue, we would not see such a high degree of 
volatility in the regulation of it. The Dutch case, again, provides a good example. 
 
 
Figure 4 . Attitudes towards im migrant and emigrant 
dual citiz enship in the Net herlands (2 0 1 2 ) 
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Together with Hans Schmeets and Statistics Netherlands, I have investigated attitudes 
to dual citizenship in the Netherlands.
30 
As part of the Dutch Election Survey in 2010 
and 2012, we asked respondents whether they thought that immigrants who naturalize 
in the Netherlands should be required to renounce their previous citizenship. In 2012, 
49 percent of respondents agreed with the renunciation requirement (Figure 4). This 
 
29 
Faist et al 2004, 916. 
30 
Schmeets and Vink 2011; Vink, Gielen and Schmeets 2015. 
16  
means they are against dual citizenship for immigrants. 31 percent disagreed and 20 
percent neither agreed, nor disagreed. These percentages were largely comparable in 
2010. 
 
 
When looking at political preferences, unsurprisingly we find that almost all 
respondents (80 percent) who indicate they voted for the PVV, the Freedom Party, 
hold a negative view on immigrant dual citizenship. Among center-right voters, a bit 
over 50 percent of voters is against immigrant dual citizenship. In further analyses, we 
demonstrate that a negative attitude to dual citizenship is linked to perceiving 
immigration as a cultural threat, to negative views on admission of asylum seekers 
and to the need for immigrants to assimilate culturally. Hence, skepticism about dual 
citizenship is connected to fears about migration and its consequences.
31
 
 
 
 
In 2012, we also asked respondents for their views on emigrant dual citizenship: 
should Dutch citizens (such as the speeds skaters I just discussed) who acquire 
another citizenship be allowed maintain their Dutch citizenship? As you see in the 
slide, we find that the negative attitudes towards dual citizenship for immigrants are 
not mirrored when asked for dual citizenship among emigrants: 45 percent of 
respondents agrees that Dutch citizens naturalizing abroad should be allowed to retain 
their Dutch citizenship, whereas only 32 percent disagrees with that statement. 
 
 
The largest discrepancy can be found among Christian-Democratic voters: whereas a 
majority of these voters is against immigrant dual citizenship (51 percent against, 32 
percent in favor), a clear majority is in favor of emigrant dual citizenship (49 percent 
in favor, 29 against). We also find that our explanatory model for attitudes to dual 
citizenship (e.g. perceiving immigration as a cultural threat) does not work as well for 
attitudes to emigrant dual citizenship, as it does for attitudes to immigrant dual 
citizenship. 
 
 
In other words, citizenship (especially dual citizenship) also seems to elude voters. 
These ambiguous views are problematic both legally and normatively. Legally, if one 
were to require naturalizing immigrants to renounce their previous citizenship, but 
 
31 
The largest support in favor of dual citizenship among the major parties is among D66 voters, the 
Liberal Democrats, where 61 percent of voters supports dual citizenship and only 28 percent is against. 
17  
allow Dutch citizens to acquire another, naturalized immigrants would simply 
reacquire their previous citizenship without penalty. Hence, legally, a mixed approach 
makes little sense. Normatively, there is no convincing justification for requiring 
immigrants to renounce their citizenship of origin, but allowing Dutch citizens to 
naturalize abroad without penalty. 
 
 
Hence, there is much to say for maintaining the current situation, where the 
exceptions to the renunciation requirement for naturalizing immigrants in the 
Netherlands are mirrored in the exceptions on the loss provision applying to Dutch 
citizens naturalizing abroad. Or –in line with the broader European and global trend– 
to accept dual citizenship altogether. But the data show why this is politically difficult 
in the Netherlands: voters remain skeptical about dual citizenship, at least for 
immigrants. 
 
 
 
 
5. Naturalization outcomes and the citizenship premium 
 
 
 
Now that we have discussed the politics of citizenship, do citizenship policies actually 
matter? And, if so, for whom and how do they matter? 
 
 
Let’s look at the available statistics about citizenship acquisition in the European 
Union (EU). 
 
 
First, around 800 thousand persons per year acquire the citizenship of an EU member 
state.
32 
These are mostly people who did not get the citizenship of that country when 
they were born, but acquired this later in life. 
 
 
Second, while a bit under a million of naturalizations per year may seem a lot, 
remember that around 500 million people currently live in one of the EU’s 28 
member states. Of these, there are around 20 million foreign residents (4%).
33 
In 
 
32 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- 
explained/index.php/Acquisition_of_citizenship_statistics#Further_Eurostat_information     [last    accessed 
on 25 April 2015]. 
33
See    http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- 
explained/index.php/Population_and_population_change_statistics [last accessed on 25 April 2015] 
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2012, the average naturalization rate in the EU, calculated as the percentage of foreign 
resident population that acquires the citizenship of a state, was a bit over 2%. Though 
this varies greatly between Hungary (almost 13%) and Slovakia (less than 0.5%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third, looking only at a single year obscures the trends in these acquisition rates, 
which vary greatly over time. In the Netherlands, around 4% of all resident foreigners 
acquired Dutch citizenship in 2012. That’s around 30.000 people per year. If this 
seems like a high number to you, keep in mind that in 1996 still 80.000 foreigners 
acquired Dutch citizenship and that since then the numbers have steadily decreased. 
Figure 5 visualizes this trend. 
 
 
For anyone with a bit of knowledge about Dutch citizenship law, it will be self- 
evident that this trend relates closely to changing requirements for naturalization. 
First, the strong increase in the number of naturalizations in the 1990s can be directly 
related to the abolishment of the requirement to renounce one’s previous citizenship, 
between 1991 and 1996. Second, the low number of naturalizations since 2003 can be 
 
 
and http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- 
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Foreign_and_foreign- 
born_population [last accessed on 25 April 2015]. 
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directly related to the introduction of the naturalization exam in 2003 and the 
increased fees over the past decades. 
 
 
However, deriving the effects of policies on naturalization rates is not so 
straightforward. Aggregate statistics on citizenship, as provided by Eurostat or the 
national statistical offices, provide a useful overview of main trends, but they are not 
easily comparable between countries. 
34
 
 
 
Naturalization rates vary not only because of citizenship policies, but also because of 
factors related to country of origin and the individual life situation of the immigrant. 
For example, immigrants from more developed countries (from countries with  a 
higher Human Development Index or HDI) have a much lower probability to 
naturalize than those from the least developed countries.
35 
Whereas most immigrants 
from the least developed countries tend to naturalize, only 20 percent of those from 
the most developed countries naturalize. From other research we know that also the 
political stability and the dual citizenship regulations of an origin country matter.
36
 
 
 
In other words, when analyzing immigrant naturalization rates, it is important to have 
information on the demographic composition of the immigrant population of a 
country. 
 
 
In a 2013 paper with Tijana Prokic and Jaap Dronkers we control statistically for 
these differences in the demographic composition of migrant populations and for the 
relative accessibility of citizenship. For that we used an indicator produced by the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). The 2015 version of MIPEX has just been 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
Reported statistics do not always refer to similar categories of persons across member states 
(Poulain, Perrin and Singleton 2006). See also Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international 
protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on 
foreign workers [2007] OJ L 199, pp. 23-29. Comparative citizenship statistics are even more 
problematic with regard to statistics on the loss of citizenship, as demonstrated in a report with Chun 
Luk as part of the EU-sponsored ILEC project. See Vink and Luk (2014). 
35 
Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013). 
36 
Moreover, it makes a difference how long on immigrants reside in a country, whether they are for 
example married to a native or to a foreign-born resident who has already naturalized, whether the 
immigrant has children, etcetera. Cf. Yang (1994), Dronkers and Vink (2012). 
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launched by the Migration Policy Group in Brussels. 
37 
We found that –indeed– 
citizenship policies do matter. However, they matter most for the migrants who are 
most in need of citizenship, namely those from less developed countries. On average, 
whereas only 20% of immigrants in the most restrictive countries naturalize if they 
have lived there between 6 to 10 years, almost 60% naturalizes in those countries with 
the most accessible laws. For immigrants from highly developed countries, policies 
do not matter: their naturalization rates are much lower and citizenship acquisition is 
mostly a function of length of residence in the destination country. 
 
 
Of course, as we already saw in the Netherlands, countries do not have stable 
accessible or restrictive citizenship policies. Policies change, sometimes opening up 
citizenship, as Portugal did in 2006, sometimes restricting it, as the Netherlands did in 
2003. In the literature, there is surprisingly little interest in the effects of these policy 
changes, even though this is the question with the greatest policy relevance. Often, it 
is assumed that policy restrictions lower naturalization rates. But actually we know 
little about the question for whom these restrictions matter most and how much. 
 
 
In research I currently do with Floris Peters and Hans Schmeets, supported by 
MACIMIDE and Statistics Netherlands, we analyze population register-data from the 
Netherlands over the period since 1995. In this analysis we look at foreign-born 
residents in the Netherlands and include statistical controls for origin country and 
individual characteristics of immigrants. 
 
 
We find that the restriction of Dutch citizenship law in April 2003 had a significantly 
negative impact on immigrant naturalization rates.
38 
Among immigrants who arrived 
in Netherlands in 1995, 1996 or 1997 on average 58 percent is naturalized after 10 
years. Yet, among cohorts from 2000, 2001 and 2002, only 42 percent was naturalized 
after a similar period. These differences are even greater if you look at those groups 
who  are  most  in  need  of  citizenship,  such  as  immigrants  from  less  developed 
 
37 
In order to statistically measure the impact of varying in citizenship policies, we also need precise 
and reliable indicators for the relative accessibility of citizenship laws. These are provided, for 
example, by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which is produced by the Migration Policy 
Group in Brussels. Access to citizenship can be measured by looking at the years of residence required 
before naturalization, the fees, the integration exam and the requirement to renounce one’s previous 
citizenship, for example. See http://www.mipex.eu [last accessed 25 April 2015]. 
38 
Peters, Vink and Schmeets 2015. 
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countries. 
 
 
We compare immigrants from cohorts that could still naturalize under the pre-2003 
legislation and those who could only do so under the stricter 2003 law. We find that 
for immigrants from highly developed countries the propensity to naturalize is 
virtually the same between cohorts that fall under the pre and post 2003 legislation. 
However, for immigrants from less developed countries, the difference is significant: 
immigrants from cohorts that fall under the stricter 2003 legislation naturalize later 
and less often. 
 
 
In other words: we see that policy does matter, especially for those immigrants who 
are most interested in acquiring citizenship of the country in which they live. It is not 
just that, under the 2003 law, these immigrants postpone naturalization, they seem to 
be put off altogether. And if you argue that this was precisely what was intended, I 
would disagree. The 2003 changes to the Dutch citizenship law, including the 
naturalization exam, were motivated by a political agenda of failed integration 
policies. Hence the changes were aimed at improving immigrant integration. Yet, the 
result of these changes, as the analysis shows, was only a more selective access to 
citizenship. The Dutch case shows how the instrumentalization of citizenship policies 
makes citizenship not less, but more elusive, for large groups of immigrants. 
 
 
One last issue I would like to discuss with you is whether it matters how fast 
immigrants naturalize. This question is relevant in light of the proposal by the current 
government in the Netherlands to increase the residence requirement for ordinary 
naturalization from 5 to 7 years.
39 
The assumption is that immigrants who naturalize 
later will be better integrated at the moment of naturalization. Hence, naturalizing 
later is better. But is that so…? 
 
 
First of all, actually we know surprisingly little about whether it matters if immigrants 
naturalize faster or slower. This is because most of the literature is focused on 
analyzing whether naturalization maters, rather than on finding out why, how and for 
whom it matters. 
 
39 
Wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap ter verlenging van de termijnen voor verlening 
van het Nederlanderschap en enige andere wijzigingen, Voorstel van Rijkswet, 33 852 (R2023), Nr. 2. 
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Bevelander and DeVoretz have recently argued that a fast-track to citizenship can 
maximize the potential for settlement success, although too short a waiting period 
before naturalization can diminish its potential.
40 
Their reasoning is that citizenship 
acquisition by immigrants can have a premium on the labor market (better 
employability, higher income) because it sends a positive signal to employers about 
the long-term settlement in the country. After a very short period (for example 2 or 3 
years), they argue that the ‘accumulated country-specific human capital’ (education, 
knowledge of labor market, language) is still minimal. Hence, with a very short 
residence requirement, the citizenship ascension rates are high, many immigrants may 
naturalize, but the labor market pay-off of doing so will be minimal. 
 
 
However, if the waiting period for citizenship becomes too long, on the other hand, 
the citizenship premium inevitably declines. Naturalized immigrants simply have 
fewer years to profit from a positive signal vis-à-vis employers, if they naturalize after 
a longer waiting time. Hence there will be less incentive for immigrants to accumulate 
human capital while waiting for citizenship.
41
 
 
 
With Tijana Prokic-Breuer and Jaap Dronkers, I did some preliminary analysis on the 
question of whether the speed of naturalization matters.
42 
We used data from the 
European Labour Force Survey (Ad hoc module on Labour Market Situation of 
Migrants) from 2008 and analyzed the relation between speed of naturalization and 
the probability of having paid employment, among immigrants. We controlled for 
individual and country of origin characteristics. 
 
 
While the picture is mixed, we found that in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany 
there is a negative correlation between years of residence until naturalization, on the 
one hand, and the probability of having paid employment, on the other. This suggests 
that immigrants who naturalize later, perform less well on the labor market. Hence we 
do not find support for the argument that it is better for immigrants to naturalize after 
 
40 
Bevelander and DeVoretz 2014. 
41 
Moreover, if citizenship becomes out of reach, then this may stimulate outmigration of economically 
capable candidates for citizenship. Research in Germany has demonstrated that indeed naturalized 
immigrants are less likely to out-migrate (Kuhlenkasper and Steinhardt 2012). 
42 
Prokic-Breuer, Dronkers and Vink 2013. 
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a longer residence period only, at least not in the Netherlands. If anything, the data 
suggest the opposite: the faster an immigrant naturalizes, the higher the citizenship 
premium on the labor market. 
 
 
From this perspective, there are good reasons to caution against the government 
proposal that is currently under discussion in the Netherlands. As Bevelander and 
DeVoretz argue, a longer pathway essentially leads to lower naturalization rates and it 
reduces the possibility for immigrants to make use of the positive potential of 
citizenship.
43
 
 
 
However, we should be careful when interpreting these preliminary findings. First, in 
three other countries we found no relation and in one country, the UK, we found the 
opposite relation. Hence, as is often the case in this type of research, results vary by 
country. This may be explained, for example, by the structure of labor markets in the 
UK and Continental Europe. For this reason, more comparative research is needed to 
investigate this relationship under various institutional conditions. 
 
 
Second, in order to analyze whether naturalization makes a difference, one needs to 
draw on longitudinal data, rather than the cross-sectional survey data we used in our 
exploratory analysis. Longitudinal data, for example those we employ in the 
MACIMIDE research project with Floris Peters and Hans Schmeets, based on Dutch 
register-data, allow us to detect whether citizenship acquisition actually improves 
labor market outcomes or whether, by contrast, better integrated immigrants are 
simply more likely to naturalize. These results we hope to share within the next year. 
Moreover, further comparative research is required to compare such findings from the 
Netherlands with those from other countries, based on similar types of high quality 
register data. This is something I plan to work on in the coming years, especially with 
colleagues from Scandinavian countries where similar type of register-data are 
available as in the Netherlands. So there’s more work still to do in this field… 
 
 
 
 
43 
In its advice on the draft law, the Dutch Council of State observed that a clear motivation for this 
restriction is missing and if no such motivation can be provided, the proposed amendment should be 
withdrawn. Wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap ter verlenging van de termijnen voor 
verlening van het Nederlanderschap en enige andere wijzigingen, Advies Afdeling Advisering Raad 
van State van het Koninkrijk en Nader Rapport, 33 852 (R2023), Nr. 4. 
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6. A political sociology approach: interdisciplinary and comparative 
 
 
 
Let me sum up my main argument: 
 
- Citizenship is an elusive concept: it is both everything and nothing. By 
defining its permanent population, citizenship is an important constituent 
element of the modern nation-state. Yet, its meaning depends on the context in 
which it is practiced: states attach different rights to citizenship and each state 
employs different rules for the acquisition and loss of citizenship. Hence, 
citizenship is an important status that can, however, mean different things. 
- Citizenship eludes policy-makers and voters: states have autonomy to regulate 
the access to citizenship; yet, in an interconnected world, policies in one 
country do affect outcomes in other countries. Moreover, phenomena that 
were previously considered undesirable, such as dual citizenship, become 
increasingly unavoidable. Hence, we see the acceptance of dual citizenship 
gradually spreading across the world. Policy-makers in states with restrictive 
policies, such as the Netherlands, are increasingly under pressure from their 
emigrant community to loosen these rules. At the same time, domestic 
electorates provide a counterbalance, pushing for restrictive policies as in the 
Netherlands, where attitudes towards citizenship are ambiguous, with dual 
citizenship tolerated for one group (emigrants), but not for others 
(immigrants). 
- Citizenship also eludes individuals: varying naturalization rates demonstrate 
that citizenship has different meanings to different persons: some immigrants 
may be able to naturalize, but they are not interested in doing so; for others, 
however, acquiring citizenship of a developed country provides a potentially 
life-changing event. Yet restrictive rules and high costs do discourage people 
from naturalizing and are most discouraging for those who need citizenship 
most. Citizenship is elusive and its instrumentalization for political agendas 
makes it even more so. 
 
 
To conclude, I would like to say a few words about the “Chair of Political Science 
with a focus on Political Sociology”, which I accept today with this public lecture, 
and my research agenda for the coming years. 
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As one of my two PhD supervisors at Leiden University, Herman van Gunsteren, 
already observed back in 1978, citizenship as a concept is essentially contested.
44 
Its 
meaning depends on ideological view point and on the context in which it is 
practiced. Hence, citizenship is elusive by its nature and requires versatility from us as 
analysts in two important ways: while interdisciplinarity is required to capture the 
multiple dimensions of the concept of citizenship, a comparative approach is essential 
to capture its contingency. 
 
 
Now, this is easier said than done. If there is one thing I have come to realize over the 
past years, through research but also teaching experience, it is that inter-disciplinarity 
does not come cheap. 
 
 
For the citizenship research agenda I outlined today, analyzing the causes and 
consequences of citizenship policies, this means that you need to be a lawyer, political 
scientist, sociologist and economist at the same time. After all, we need law to collect 
and interpret information about national laws in light of constitutional and 
international law standards. But how these laws come about, is a different matter. 
This is where political science comes in. And how they affect naturalization rates and 
labour market outcomes among immigrants, that’s where we need sociologists and 
economists. And, finally, I should not forget normative theorists, for a reflection on 
how citizenship should be governed. 
 
 
Now, whereas these different questions can of course be studied separately, a truly 
inter-disciplinary research agenda approaches these questions in an integrated 
manner. First of all, this is important because without valid data on citizenship law, 
statistical analyses on developments in citizenship policies, or on the effects of 
policies on naturalization rates, would be impossible. Second, an analysis of 
naturalization rates or integration outcomes also requires a systematic understanding 
of the institutional context. If there is one thing you can observe in the thriving 
literature on the question of whether citizenship matters for immigrant integration, it 
is that results of different studies often differ greatly. For some this is an argument 
 
 
44 
Van Gunsteren 1978; cf. Gallie 1956. 
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that citizenship, in the end, does not really matter. But for me this just means that 
there is underlying contextual variation that we do not yet understand well. Hence, 
sociologists and economists benefit from collaboration with lawyers and political 
scientists. 
 
 
The sub-discipline of political sociology, which involves the systematic study of the 
relations between state and society, offers such a bridge between political science and 
sociology. My own research, as presented today, illustrates what an interdisciplinary 
political sociology approach can contribute to citizenship studies. 
 
 
I see it as a core responsibility of this Chair to further interdisciplinary and 
comparative research on political sociology themes, such as migration and 
citizenship, but also on broader themes within European Studies, within the Faculty of 
Arts and Social Sciences (FASoS) and at Maastricht University at large. This means 
building bridges, both within my own faculty and between faculties. As I hope to 
have demonstrated today, such bridges offer a chance to overcome the constraints of 
narrow disciplinary approaches. A successful political sociology agenda for 
citizenship, which is based on fundamental research and is policy-relevant, needs to 
be both comparative and interdisciplinary. Citizenship may be elusive, but there are 
ways of dealing with that. 
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